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THEFREETRADE AGREEMENTPARADOX
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS*
There is broad consensus that trade liberalisation is best achieved by negotiating
reductions in trade barriers under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
rounds of multilateral negotiations. Notwithstanding this consensus, Free Trade
Agreements ("FTAs") have been proliferating at a rapid pace for many years now. The
diversion of effort into negotiating FTAs, as well as the types of FTAs being negotiated,
is undermining the ability to liberalise trade at the multilateral level. This article
identifies this state of affairs as a paradox of sorts and seeks to explain the reasons for
the paradox as well as to identify some potential solutions.

I. INTRODUCTION
''The last dozen years have seen a proliferation of customs unions and free
trade areas of unforeseen proportions. Such regional arrangements, far from
being halfway houses on the road to non-discriminatory and freer trade, may
be in direct conflict with those goals." These words nicely summarise the
concerns academics and others are voicing today - yet the above was
authored by Kenneth Dam in

1963 . 1 Thus the challenges posed by free trade

agreements2 ("FTAs")3 are not new. The intractability of some of the
problems, and the further· proliferation of FTAs over the past several decades,
have only served to heighten the uneasiness many feel with the current
situation.
FTAs have been multiplying for several years now. Yet industry routinely
complains that FTAs are "second best" and that the multilateral World Trade
Organization ("WTO") system is the preferred route to trade liberalisation.

Consumers and workers also express concerns about these arrangements. What
*

Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Victoria University of Wellington.
W Darn, "Regional Economic Arrangements and the GATI: The Legacy of a
Misconception" (1963) 30 U Chi L Rev 615,615.
K

2

A free trade agreement is, in its purest form, an agreement between two or more countries
that trade between them will be free - that is to say that each agreement member will lower
its tariffs to zero for products being imported from the other member or members. Free trade
agreements can also include commitments to liberalise non-tariff barriers to trade such as
opportunities in the services sector and investment rules. In practice, as discussed below, free
trade agreements often feature exceptions allowing tariffs and other barriers to be maintained
for certain sensitive products or sectors, and can include long timeframes for members to
fully reduce tariffs on the products covered. Nonetheless, the primary purpose of most free
trade agreements is to enhance trade opportunities between members by reducing tariffs and
other trade barriers in a faster and/or more comprehensive way than is likely to occur through
multilateral trade negotiations. See generally John H Jackson, William J Davey, and Alan 0
Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text
(4th ed, 2002) ch 1 1 .

3

These agreements are variously referred to as RTAs (regional trade agreements), PTAs
(preferential trade agreements), and FTAs (free trade agreements). Although "RTA" may be
the most commonly used term, it is not particularly accurate given the increasing number of
agreements between countries from different regions. While "PTA" is perhaps the most
comprehensive term, encompassing FTAs, customs unions, and partial scope trade
agreements, it also may suggest an inherent disapproval that this article does not seek to
convey. Therefore, as the vast maJority of trade agreements today are free trade agreements,
this article uses "FTA" as the general term to apply to all of these types of. agreements.

I
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explains this seeming paradox? This article will explore thre� reasons why
FfAs have become ubiquitous de�pite the widespread view that the WTO is
the better way to achieve meaningful global reductions in trade barriers. Part II
will set forth the paradox. Part

ill will set forth three possible explanations for

this phenomenon: first, that there is a "me too" effect occurring in which
countries are responding defensively to the existence of other Ff As by joining
their own bilateral agreements; second, that the current WTO mechanisms for
reviewing Ff As are insufficient to prevent countries from entering into
protectionist and/or politically motivated agreements; and third that there is a
prisoner's dilemma at work whereby it is rational at present for countries to

1:
�
.
...

enter into FfAs despite the more efficient outcome that would be reached if
countries eschewed FfAs in favour of liberalising trade through the WTO's
multilateral system. Part IV will propose some possible solutions to the FfA
paradox.

"

��.

II. THE FfA DISCONNECT
The WTO is an international organisation

that,

through the collective

agreements of its members, establishes rules governing international trade and
enforces those rules through dispute settlement procedures. The WTO came
into effect on

1 January 1995 and is the successor to the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"). The GATT, which dealt with trade in goods, is
now incorporated into the WTO, and the WTO also includes newer rules
governing other areas including intellectual property, services, and dispute
settlement.4 One of the core principles of the GATT, and now the WTO, is that
of most-favoured nation

("MFN"). This concept, enshrined in Article I o( the

�'

GATT, provides that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by
any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product
originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties".5 In
other words, WTO member countries are supposed to treat other member
countries equally well in terms of providing market access in order to
minimise instances of discrimination among members. 6

MFN treatment

4

Although the GATI has been incorporated into the WTO, the original provisions are still
referred to and properly referenced as articles of GATI. Thus this article refers to "GATI
consistency" wh�n discussing GATI Article XXN. Unlike the WTO, the GATT was only a
treaty and not recognised as an international organisation. Its signatories were therefore
referred to as "contracting parties" rather than members. The WTO however is an
international organisation and its signatories are referred to as members. GATI contracting
parties had to agree to an entire package of trade-related agreements in order to accede to the
new WTO in 1995. At present the WTO has 148 members accounting for approximately
ninety-seven per cent of world trade. For additional background on the GATI and WTO, see
generally John H Jackson, William J Davey, and Alan 0 Sykes Jr, Legal Problems of
International Economic Relations - Cases, Materials and Text on the National and
International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations (4th ed, 2002); Andreas F
Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (2002); and <www.wto.org>.

5

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments Results ofthe Uruguay Round (1994) vol 31 Annex 1, Art 1; (1994) 33 ILM 1153.
,

6

Other purposes of MFN are to reduce the transaction costs that result from having different
import criteria for products depending on their country of origin and to reduce tensions that
may result between countries as a result of differential treatment. See J H Jackson,
''Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y lnt'l Bus 873, 875.
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originally applied primarily to goods, but has now been expanded to services
in the form of the WTO's General Agreement

on Trade in Services

("GATS").7
Notwithstanding the importance
GATT/WTO

system

has

long

placed

provided

on the MFN principle, the

for

various

exceptions

to

the

application of this core concept. For example, the GATT Enabling Clause
provides a legal basis for developed countries to give differential and more
favourable treatment to developing countries than they give to other developed
countries. 8 In the absence of the Enabling Clause, developed countries would
not be permitted to give more favourable access to developing countries
because of their obligation under MFN to treat all members equally.
For purposes of this article, the most important exceptions to the MFN rule
are Article XXIV of the GATT and Article V of the GATS, which allow for
the creation of customs unions and free-trade areas. The GATT required a
provision such as Article XXIV so that the European Economic Community
("EEC"), which was simultaneously being negotiated, could exist in a manner
that would be consistent with the new international trading regime.9 As a
customs union, the EEC violated the MFN principle by imposing duties on
goods imported from non-EEC members but not on goods imported from
countries within the EEC.10 It was thus necessary for the GATT to provide an
exception

to

the

MFN requirement

for

customs

unions

and

FTAs.

Article XXIV permits countries to apply tariffs on a discriminatory basis - by
favouring their Ff A partners with lower rates than other members - so long
as the conditions of that Article are satisfied. Article XXIV requires 1) that an
FfA or customs union reduce or remove barriers on "substantially all" trade
between the parties to the agreement, 11 and 2) that the "duties and other.
7

The GATS Agreement states that "each [WfO] Member shall accord immediately and
unconditionally to services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no Jess
favourable than that it accords to like services and service suppliers of any other country".
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal Instruments Results of the Uruguay Round (1994) vol

8

31, Annex lB, Art II( I).

The Enabling Clause, more formally known as the "Decision on Differential and More
Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries", was
adopted under GATT in

1979. The Enabling Clause is exercised primarily through the

Generalised System of Preferences ("GSP"), under which developed countries can offer

preferential market access (such as zero or very low tariff rates) to developing countries even
when such access is non-reciprocal and is not extended to all developing countries. In
addition, the Enabling Clause provides the legal basis for developing countries to enter into
regional arrangements amongst themselves that do not rise to the level of comprehensiveness

Of an FrA, and for the Global System of Trade Preferences ("GSTP") under which various
developing countries grant each other trade concessions that are not extended to the wro
membership at large. See generally, WfO Trade and Development Committee, Work on
Special and Differential Provisions, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20
October 2005).

9

S M Cone ill, "'The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored Nation

Treatment and 'Imperial Preference'" (2005) 26 Mich J lnt'l L 563,567. Customs unions entail
the members dropping tariffs between themselves to zero and the setting of a common external

tariff. In contrast, free trade agreements only affect tariffs between the signatories, but each
signatory maintains its own tariff scheme for countries not party to the FrA

10

When Art XXIV was drafted in 1947, it only provided for customs unions; language
providing for "free-trade area[s)" was added later.

11

GATI, ArtXXIV:8.

l'
.
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regulations of commerce" applied by FfA members to WTO members outside
the FI'A "shall not be higher or more restrictive" after the FI'A comes into
effect than previously.12
Customs unions and FfAs were envisioned as
be

utilised

only

occasionally,

and

faithful

MFN exceptions that would
to

the

purposes

behind

Article XXIVY :Instead, while customs unions have been relatively unusual,14

FfAs have proliferated, and the agreements that have arisen by and large have
not satisfied the requirements and purposes of Article XXIV. The WTO
mechanism for ensuring that FI'As comply with Article XXIV has also been
largely ineffective.15 As a result, there has been increasing criticism of FI'As
and concern about their impact on the ability of the multilateral WTO system
to continue to move forward with further trade liberalisation.
The criticisms of FJ'As are many and varied. One argument, first raised in

1950 by the noted economist Jacob Viner, cautions that arrangements such as
customs unions and FfAs can be trade diverting rather than trade promoting.

1•6

Trade diversion occurs when an Ff A has the effect of enhancing the exports of
an FfA member at the expense· of imports that were previously purchased

from a country or countries not party to the FfA.

Others disfavour Ff As because they divert attention and resources away

from multilateral liberalisation efforts under the WTO framework.17 As
countries direct their efforts to negotiating FfAs, they may lack the drive - or
for that matter the staff - to simultaneously work towards multilateral
progress in the forum of the WTO. \8 As was stated in a recent WTO report,
"the diversion of skilled and experienced negotiating resources into [FI'As)
especially for developing nations and probably for rich countries also - is too

12

Ibid, Art XXIV:5(b). The applicable provision for customs unions provides that duties and
regulations "shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence"
prior to the creation of the customs union. Also ibid, Art XXIV:5(a): this provision has
sparked a number of interpretation problems. See Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GAIT Article
XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 894-895.
GATS, Art V contains provisions that differ slightly from those of GAIT, Art XXIV.

13

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 2 1 , available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

14

As of 31 January, 2002 there were 162 FfAs in force; of these, only 13 were customs unions.
Of the remainder, 115 were FrAs, 19 were agreements notified under the Enabling Clause,
and 15 under Art V of GATS: WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements, Basic
Information on Regional Trade Agreements, (WTIREGIW/44, 2002).

15

See for example Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New
Millenium (2004) 21, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

16

Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (1950) 44.

17

For example, some in the United States have argued that United States businesses would
have been better served by the government putting its negotiating resources into the
multilateral WTO negotiations instead of negotiating FfAs with little economic benefit. See
WTO, "Advisory Report Calls for WTO Push to End Tariffs to Counter Trade Preferences
Threat" (2005) 22 ITR 7 1 .

18

See P Sutherland, 'The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to th e World
Trading System- A Cosmopolitan Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366.

558

Vol21

New Zealand Universities Law Review

great to permit adequate focus on the multilateral stage."19 This problem is

particularly acute for least developed and developing countries that may only

have enough staff to engage in one trade negotiation at a time.20 If the entire
government negotiating team is working on achieving an FfA, there is simply
no staff available to push for progress in the WTO forum.
A further concern

is the complexity and cost

associated with the

inconsistent rules of origin running through the multitude of FfAs. Such rules
are necessary to determine which goods qualify for the preferential FfA tariff

rate and which do not. Applicable tariffs may vary significantly based on

whether or not the country of origin for a given import is an FfA partner. This

determination is straightforward for goods produced solely in one country

from materials originating in that country. The situation becomes significantly

more complex, however, when cotton from one country is woven in another,

cut into garments in a third, and finished with appliques in a fourth. Different

countries have different ways of determining the country of origin. The so

called rules of origin problem is further complicated by the existence of FfAs

with different rules of origin criteria. Country "A" may have different criteria

under its FfA with "B" than it does under its FfA with "C". Jagdish Bhagwati

has likened the tangle of overlapping obligations and alignments to a
"spaghetti bowl" that "clutters up trade with discrimination depending on the

'nationality' of a good".21 In addition to the clutter, there is significant expense

involved in administering rules of origin in Ff As.22

Those concerned with development issues also have concerns about FfAs,

arguing that developing countries have strength in numbers within the WTO

- an advantage that is lost in bilateral negotiations. At least in the multilateral
context

the

world's

most

economically

vulnerable

countries

can

and

sometimes do band together for negotiation purposes.23 But the advantages of

being a part of the LDC Group or Africa Group are lost in the context of a one-

19

Report by the Consultative Board to theDirector-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,

20

Ibid, 23. But seeM Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or

The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193, 198 (arguing that the PTA process had led to
Singapore increasing the size of its trade negotiating team and adding to its overall trade
negotiating expertise).
21

J Bhagwati, "US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati and

22

SeeD Palmeter, "Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements" ( 1996) 27 Law &

Anne 0 Krueger (eds),

The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements (1995) 2-3.

Pol'y Int'l Bus 991, 996 (noting that the cost of demonstrating country of origin led exporters
of up to twenty-five per cent of the trade from individual European Free Trade Association
countries that would presumably have been eligible for preferential access to the European
Union to forego that preferential rate and just pay the standardMFN rate of duty).

23

The developing countries have organised themselves into different coalitions, including the
African

Group

and

the Least-Developed

Countries

("LDC")

Group.

The

countries

comprising these alliances sometimes see their interests as aligned and negotiate collectively
under the framework of their Group. For example, the Africa Group and LDC Group have

worked in concert on reducing barriers to access to developed markets for textiles and
clothing. See for example WTO, "Understanding the WTO:Developing Countries", available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). In other circumstances however
these countries do not share common interests and negotiate in their individual capacities.
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on-one negotiation with a developed country trading partner.24 There is also a

fear that developing countries will be compelled to make major concessions in

exchange for fairly limited concessions from developed country trading

partners.25

Furthermore, because FTAs are preferential in nature - giving more

beneficial trade access to those in the agreement than to those excluded from it

-some warn that as FTAs proliferate, the core GATT and WTO principle of

MFN has been eroded to the point that it can be more accurately characterised
as LFN, or least-favoured nation.26 A startling illustration of this phenomenon

is the fact that the European Union ("EU")27 has so many preferential

arrangements that only nine WTO member countries fail to qualify for
treatment more favourable than MFN.28 All other WTO members have some

24

See for example P Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the
WTO" (2003) 8 International Negotiation 79 (arguing that due to disparities in bargaining
power, developing countries would do better to negotiate in groups within the WTO than to
enter into bilateral negotiations with developed countries). Some question whether trade
liberalisation of any kind is an appropriate strategy. See Jane Kelsey, The New Zealand
Experiment (1995), arguing that New Zealand's unilateral trade liberalisation efforts had a
highly negative effect on the country. A detailed consideration of the arguments against trade
liberalisation is beyond the scope of this article.

25

In the Australasian context, Jane Kelsey has argued that the Pacific Island countries have
been heavily pressured to negotiate the regional trade agreements known as PICTA (Pacific
Island Countries Trade Agreement) and PACER (Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic
Relations). She argues that the power imbalance is felt especially keenly in PACER, which
features tiny, subsistence economies alongside the developed nations Australia and New
Zealand. See J Kelsey, "World Trade and Small Nations in the South Pacific Region" (2005)
14 Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy 247; J Kelsey, "Big Brothers Behaving Badly:
The hnplications for the Pacific Islands of the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic
Relations" in Pacific Network on Globalisation, Interim Report (April 2004). See also
P Drahos, "When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the WTO" (2003)
8 International Negotiation 79, 80 (using the example of the Jordan-United States FTA as an
example of a developing country agreeing to unfavourable terms in the context of bilateral
negotiations with a more powerful developed country).

26

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 19, available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). See also P Sutherland, ''The Doha
Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the World Trading System- A Cosmopolitan
Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366 ("the reality is that one of the central pillars of
the WTO- most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment- has been undermined to the point that
it may become meaningless.").

27

The European Economic Community was renamed the European Community and
incorporated into the European Union in 1992 pursuant to the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on
European Union (EU), 7 February 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) I, 3 1 I.L.M. 253). The European
Union is a WTO member, as are its twenty-five constituent countries. This article refers to
the European Economic Community or EEC when discussing events preceding the creation
of the European Union, and otherwise to the European Union or EU.

28

The only WTO members to whom the EU does not provide preferential market access above
·
and beyond its MFN commitments are Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, Hong Kong,
China, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States. Report by the
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO:
Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 2 1, available online at
<www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).
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sort of preferential access to EU markets above and beyond the applicable

MFN access.29

It is not only academics that have concerns about FTAs. In the course of

some recent research into non-tariff barriers being faced by New Zealand

exporters of agricultural products, representatives across the sector appeared to

be more,or less united in their view that while they would benefit from the

New .zealand-Thailand FTA or from an FTA with China, what they really

wanted was progress in the WT0.30 Although FTAs are useful to the extent

they provide improved market access, they are nonetheless "second-best". The

WTO is the preferred means of trade liberalisation because multilateral tariff
reductions provide a broader range of improved access.31
Of

course

there

can

be

positive

aspects

to

FTAs.

Under

ideal

circumstances, they can provide opportunities not presently available under the

multilateral negotiating regime. For example a country such as New Zealand

that is willing to liberalise trade barriers has the opportunity through FTAs to
achieve meaningful cuts in tariff levels and other trade barriers more quickly

and comprehensively than would be possible under the multilateral system.

Likewise a country may, like Singapore, be anxious to enter into FTAs to
reduce as many trade barriers as it can as quickly as possible, and to pursue

opportunities to commit to higher levels of trade liberalisation than have been

agreed to in the WT0.32 For example, the New Zealand-Singapore FT A

contains provisions making it more difficult to limit imports through the
imposition of antidumping duties than would be the case under the Agreement

on Antidumping.33 Still other countries such as Mexico may find that they

experience benefits such as increased foreign direct investment as a result of

their FTA relationships.34 FTAs can also provide the ability to pursue trade

liberalisation in areas not yet covered in a comprehensive way by the WTO,

such as e-commerce, services, and investment issues.35 The difficulty arises

29

Europe's other trading partners have access to the European market that is more beneficial
than MFN, by virtue of various agreements including those covered by GATI Art XXIV, the
Enabling Clause, the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), and other schemes. Report
by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the
WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 21, available online
at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

30

This research was conducted by the author and Associate Professor Gordon Anderson of the
Victoria University of Wellington Law School. Additional findings of that research will be
the subject of a future joint article.

31

See "Regional Free Trade Deals 'Second Best' " (3 May 2005) The Dominion Post
Wellington C6. This article summarises an interview with Fonterra Chief Executive Andrew
Ferrier and reflects Ferrier's view that while FTAs could be useful, they were a "second
best" alternative to liberalisation via the WTO.

32

M Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004)
8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193, 196.

33

Specifically, the New Zealand-Singapore FTA raises the de minimis threshold for a finding of
dumping to five per cent of the export price, as compared with the two per cent threshold
provided for in the Agreement on Antidumping. See ibid, 201.

34

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 63, available
online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

35

B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 686.
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when the new subject areas encompassed i n FTAs are not those that will lead

to the liberalising of trade such as the areas just mentioned, but instead are

topics such as labour and the environment, which will likely serve as
protectionist features dampening trade flows.

The problem is that it is the exception rather than the rule to find an FTA

that effects a true reduction of trade barriers without qualifications, conditions,

or flat out exclusions. Indeed, the WTO has concluded that many FTAs do not

show strong evidence of trade creation and that most do not realise deeper
trade integration than that achieved through the multilateral framework.36
Countries tend to continue to protect in their FfAs the products for which they

provide the most protection in the WTO context. Thus, products with high

MFN-rate tariffs still tend to have high tariffs even in the context of an FfA.37

At times countries have, despite preferring trade liberalisation through the

multilateral system, pursued FfAs when the GATT or WTO has been at a
relative standsti11.38 For example, the impetus in

1983 for the United States to
1982

enter into bilateral negotiations with Canada was the failure in November

to obtain agreement from Europe and the developing nations to begin a new

round of GATT multilateral negotiations.39 Likewise, many attribute the recent

spate of FfAs to the failed Seattle and Cancun rninisterials and the lack of

progress in the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations.40 Some trade

liberalisation is better than none, goes the thinking.41 There is some appeal to
this argument. If the FTAs that were entered into created patches of true trade

liberalisation, such FfAs would presumably help nudge barriers down on a

multilateral level whether or not negotiations were ongoing at the time the
FfA was negotiated. This was arguably the case when the creation of the EEC

spurred the United States to initiate several successive rounds of GATT

negotiations.42 Countries may also enter into FTAs as an insurance policy of
36

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 54-55,
available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The dispute over
whether FfAs are generally trade diverting or trade creating is an important one; however, a
detailed consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.

37

Ibid, 61.

38

See for example D Palmeter, "Some Inherent Problems with Free Trade Agreements" ( 1996)
27 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus 991, 992.

39

J Bhagwati, "US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati
and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements ( 1995) 9.

40

See for example P Sutherland, "The Doha Development Agenda: Political Challenges to the
World Trading System - A Cosmopolitan Perspective" (2005) 8 J Int'l Econ L 363, 366;
R Bhala and D A Gantz, "WTO Case Review 2004" (2005) 22 Ariz J Int'l & Comp· L 99,
105-106.

41

The decision t o seek Fr As does not necessarily indicate a lack o f commitment t o the Doha
Round. See B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade
Agreements? A Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWLJ 667, 679 (documenting the United
States' repeated efforts to jump start the Doha Round agriculture negotiations notwithstanding
its increased FfA activity in recent years). Even if the commitment is present, however, the
reality is that the existence of so many FfAs makes the task of negotiating agreements
among 148 countries all the more challenging.

42

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 64, available

online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).
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sorts against the possibility that their trading partners will become more

protectionist in the future.43 And FfAs can additionally strengthen regional
and political relationships, and as such can serve an important, albeit non
economic, function.44

On the other hand, to the extent that FfAs are used as a means of imposing

trade distorting measures rather than avoiding them - a. phenomenon that is

increasingly frequent - it will be all the more difficult to get countries to
agree to dismantle such measures in the WTO context. For example, numerous

FfAs have excluded agriculture largely or entirely from their scope while
making concessions in other areas. If the WTO is to be the forum for countries

to agree to lower their agricultural tariffs, that task has been made more

difficult because countries have already obtained benefits through FfAs that
could have been used as incentives to lower agricultural tariffs.45 WTO

members are behaving in effect like children being allowed to have their

dessert before the rest of the meal. Without the sweets available as a
bargaining chip - and indeed with bellies already partly full - it will

inevitably be a heightened challenge to get the members to sit down and make

their way through the big plate of spinach that remains.

Some have argued that the WTO and regionalism are additive, meaning

that both can and should be pursued simultaneously with positive effect. For

example, then United States Treasury Under-Secretary Lawrence Summers
considered all types of trade liberalisation to be positives, arguing that:

"Economists should maintain a strong, but rebuttable presumption in favour of

all lateral reductions in trade· barriers, whether they be multi-, uni-, bi-, tri-,

plurilateral."46 Others have reached conflicting conclusions regarding the effect
of regionalism on the multilateral system.47 However, it seems likely that
pursuing an undifferentiated strategy of liberalisation on multiple fronts would

have a negative impact on the multilateral regime for multiple reasons. Unless
efforts were being made to reduce all tariffs to zero everywhere, the

43 · B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 678.
44

J H Jackson, "Perspectives on Regionalism in Trade Relations" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y lnt'l
Bus 873, 874-875.

45

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 65, available
online. at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

46

L Summers, "Regionalism and the World Trading System" in Policy Implications of Trade
and Currency Zones, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas (1991), quoted in J Bhagwati, "US
Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade Areas" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0
Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements ( 1995) 8. Summers
went on to become Secretary of the Treasury and is currently the president of Harvard
University.

47

B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements? A
Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 675-676; M Ewing-Chow, "Southeast Asia and
Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of lnt'l L 193; C M Bruner,
"Hemispheric
Integration
and
the
Politics
of
Regionalism:
The
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)" (2002) 33 U Miami Inter-Am L Rev 1, 63-64
(summarising competing views on whether FTAs are "stepping stones or stumbling blocks"
(citation omitted)).
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multilateral efforts cannot help but suffer as a result of new overlapping,

contradictory agreements.48

Although there are commentators on both sides of the issue, the consensus

seems to be that FfAs are at best of mixed benefit, and at worst a serious

problem.49

Yet FfAs have been proliferating for several years now. Of the

notified agreements in force as of early

period January

170
2005, forty-three were notified in the

2004 to February 2005 alone.50 The WTO has been notified of

twenty more agreements in the process of being ratified and seventy others
under negotiations. 51 Although some WTO members have more actively

pursued FfAs than others, the trend is all but universal. In fact there is only a

single WTO member - Mongolia- that is not involved in any sort of FfA.52

So even though the WTO is believed to be the best way to achieve trade

liberalisation, WTO members are flocking to FfAs, which are seen as second

best. The next section will suggest three potential explanations for this

seemingly paradoxical behaviour.53
Ill.

IF FfAS ARE SECOND BEST, WHY ARE THEY CONTINUING TO MULTIPLY?

Countries are evidently deciding that, notwithstanding their general preference

for liberalising trade in the multilateral context, there are other considerations

that militate in favour of pursuing FfAs. This part suggests three possible
reasons for this phenomenon.

48

Jagdish Bhagwati has also argued that NAFTA and other FTA negotiations can spark more
trade opposition in the domestic arena than would be generated in the context of WTO
liberalisations. In the absence of NAFTA, Americans would not have had the same fears
about job loss and lower wages. The Uruguay Round did not frighten developed country
citizens in the same way, because the multilateral process covered so many issues and
countries, attention was not directed towards the wage or job benefits that might accrue to
large poor countries such as India. J Bhagwati, "Preferential Trade Agreements: The Wrong
Road" (1996) 27 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus 865, 871.

49

For a more theoretical analysis of whether FTAs are a complement or an alternative to
multilateral trade liberalisation, see N N Tiny, "Regionalism and the WTO: Mutual
Accommodation at the Global Trading System" (2005) 11 Int'l TL Rev 126.

50

J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements
(2005) l , available online at <www. wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

51

Ibid, 1. When an FTA is negotiated among WTO members, the parties are supposed to notify
the WTO of the agreement by submitting documentation to the Committee on Regional
Trade Agreements ("CRTA"). The CRTA will be discussed in more detail in part ill. There
are additional FTAs that have not followed the notification process, and it is difficult to track
the exact number of such agreements. Z Hafez, ''Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and
the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 916.

52

J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements
·
(2005) 1, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

53

See "Regional Free Trade Deals 'Second Best' " (3 May 2005) The Dominion Post
Wellington C6, reporting that Renato Ruggiero, former director-general of the WTO, had
noted that "globalization is the word on everyone's lips, yet regional agreements have never
been so popular".
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A. The "Me Too" Effect
The first reason is what this article calls the "me too" effect. When A and B

enter into an FfA, there are shifts in comparative advantage whereby A and B

are now more competitive in each other's markets than previously as a result

of the reduction in tariffs between A and B. At the same time, other countries'

exporters become less competitive in A's and B's markets because their

products are subject to higher tariffs in A's market than products from B are,

and to higher tariffs in B's market than A's products are. For example, Japan's
recent bilateral FfA with Mexico will result in increased access to the

Japanese market for many Mexican agricultural products. This will put
Australian exporters of those agricultural products at a disadvantage in the

Japanese

market

relative

to

their

previous

position.54

These

shifts

in

comparative advantage therefore create powerful incentives for additional

countries to seek FfAs with A and/or B.55

The New Zealand-Thailand FfA is arguably an example of the "me too"

effect. The impetus for this seemed to have originated largely from Australia

having negotiated an FT A with Thailand. New Zealand and Australia were
previously on an equal footing in the Thai market as they were subject to the
same tariffs on their agricultural exports. The Australia-Thailand FTA changed

this dynamic. New Zealand could see that, by virtue of the FTA, Australian
agricultural exporters would gain a leg up over New Zealand exporters in the

Thai market because they would be subject to lower or entirely removed

tariffs. As a result, New Zealand had a strong incentive to take a "me too"
approach and seek its own FfA with Thailand. This phenomenon is replicated

again and again in the region and indeed around the world. There can be little

question that Australia's eagerness to negotiate an FfA with China is in part
due to New Zealand's progress in negotiating its own China FfA. Likewise,

the Australia-United States FTA may make New Zealand more anxious to
have its own FT A with the United States.

The "me too" effect is problematic in part, as previously described, because

countries "are going bilateral instead of multilateral. But it is also of concern

because existing FfAs may in some instances be held out as a model or

template for new FfA negotiations.56 A problem arises when FfAs feature

provisions that are widely divergent from WTO obligations. Examples of this

include the labour and environment provisions of the United States-Jordan

Ff A and the ultra-high intellectual property protections found in the Australia

United States FfA. It is to be expected that the United States will attempt to

54

See B Mercurio, "Should Australia Continue Negotiating Bilateral Free Trade Agreements?
A Practical Analysis" (2004) 27 UNSWU 667, 688 for a discussion of the Japan-Mexico
bilateral FTA.

55

This phenomenon has also been called "domino regionalism". See WTO, World Trade
Report 2003 (2003) 50, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

56

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTQ: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). But see M Ewing-Chow,
"Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO Plus or Bust?" (2004) 8 Sing Ybk of
Int'l L 193, 198, arguing that templates are useful in that they have increased the similarities
between different FTAs and that therefore the feared jumble of conflicting trade rules has not
come to pass.
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replicate these provisions in its future FTAs. And to the extent that such

provisions become more widespread, via the use of template terms, the United

States and other countries insisting upon such features may be in a stronger

position to insist upon their inclusion on the negotiating agenda for future

WTO rounds. The eminent members of the Consultative Panel that recently

issued a report on the state of the WTO opined that "if such requirements

cannot be justified at the front door of the WTO they probably should not be

encouraged to enter through the side door".57 Jagdish Bhagwati argues this was

precisely what the United States had in mind when it insisted on the inclusion
of environmental and labour provisions in the North American Free Trade

Agreement ("NAFTA"). Demands for such provisions had been fended off in

the GATT, but of course the United States had a much easier time convincing
its weaker neighbour in the context of one-on-one negotiations. 58

Another concern is that having a template of sorts greatly reduces

transaction costs, thus making FT As less and less burdensome to negotiate.
Given the increasing complexities of negotiating each successive WTO round,

the cookie-cutter FTA is an easy sell, particularly when proffered by powerful

countries such as the United States to weaker countries with limited resources
to devote to trade negotiations. Also, one of the benefits of having an
institution such as the WTO is the reduction in transaction costs of having a

negotiating framework in place. To the extent certain FTAs are used as

templates, this will lessen the appeal of liberalisation via the WTO.

B. FTAs That Have Objectives Other Than Reducing Trade Barriers
A second cause of the paradox is the tendency for countries to use FTAs for

means other than trade promotion.59 Indeed, many FTAs seem designed in
large part to further political or even protectionist goals.
1. Non-economic motivations

Some agreements reflect political rather than economic motivations. The
economic synergies between the United States and Jordan, for example, are far

from apparent. What is clear is that Jordan is a moderate Arab country that has

stood by the United States' side throughout the various conflicts in the Middle

East and has reached a peace agreement with Israel.

60

The FTA is a reward to

57

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The members of the Consultative
Board were Peter Sutherland (Chairman), Jagdish Bhagwati, Kwesi Botchwey, Niall
FitzGerald, Koichi Hamada, John H Jackson, Celso Lafer, and Thierry de Montbrial.

58

Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade
Agreements ( 1995)12-13.

59

See for example Q Kong, "China's WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area:
The Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer" (2004) 7 J Int'l Econ L 839, 843-844 (identifying
political aspirations and the desire to have an impact on international economic rule-making
as two of China's motivations for wanting to enter into an FTA with ASEAN).

60

The Treaty of Peace Between The State of Israel and The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was
entered into on 26 October, 1994. A copy of the treaty text may be accessed from
<www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).
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Jordan for its loyalty,61 and provides an opportunity for the United States to

impose some terms in the FfA that it would like to press on other trading

partners going forward. Likewise, while the United States-Singapore FfA has

some economic purpose to it, the timing of its signing - ahead of the

originally scheduled signing of the United States-Chile FfA - had everything
to do with politics and nothing to do with trade.62

2. Excluding sensitive sectors
While FfAs are supposed to reduce barriers between trading partners, in

practice many FfAs contain terms that are trade-inhibiting. When developed

countries form an FfA regarding trade in goods, they are required to eliminate

tariffs and other trade-restrictive regulations of commerce on "substantially all

the trade" in principle within a ten-year period as required under Article XXIV
of the GATT. There is no consensus on what "substantially all the trade"

means. Some have argued that "substantially all" should be measured in

quantitative terms, meaning a determination based on the percentage of trade
of the members to the agreement. Others have instead taken the position that
"substantially all" should be determined through a qualitative assessment,

meaning that·all major sectors of trade should be included in the agreement.63
Notwithstanding

the

numerous

Uruguay Round

negotiations

occasions

on

which

the

meaning

of

"substantially all the trade" was debated to no conclusion in the GATT era, the
did not provide a definitive answer.

The

Preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV provides:

"Such contribution is increased if the elimination between the constituent

territories of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce extends to all
trade, and diminished if any major sector of trade is excluded."64 This language

appears merely to state the obvious· and h.as not been read as providing any
definitive guidance. 65

Article XXIV has only been examined substantively in one dispute brought

before the WTO, the Turkey-Textiles case, and that case failed to shed

61

See M Nsour, "Fundamental Facets o f the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement:
E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond" (2004) 27 Fordham Int'l U 742, 742
(identifying the United States' interest in entering into an FT A and other economic
agreements with Jordan as being "[d]ue to Jordan's continuous adherence to peace"). See
also C B Picker, "Regional Trade Agreements v the WTO: A Proposal for Reform of Article
XXIV to Counter this Institutional Threat" (2005) 26 Uni of Penn J Int'l Bus L 267, 278
(identifying non-economic rationales for the FTAs the United States has entered into in the
Middle East).

62

See S M Cone III, "The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored
Nation Treatment and 'Imperial Preference' " (2005) 26 Mich J Int'l L 563, 576. Singapore
was explicitly rewarded for its support of the United States in the Iraq war, while the signing
of the Chilean agreement was delayed as a punishment for Chile's failure to support the
United States in that war. Australia may have also jumped the queue as a result of its support
for the United States' action in Iraq.

63

Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 892.

64

Preamble to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Article XXIV, para 4.

65

Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 893.
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significant light on the issue. The Appellate Body' s attempt to clarify the

meaning of "substantially all the trade" is regrettably lacking:66

Neither the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES nor the WTO Members have ever
reached an agreement on the interpretation of the term "substantially" in this
provision. It is clear, though, that "substantially all the trade" is not the same as

all

the trade, and also that "substantially all the trade" is something considerably more
than merely

some

of the trade.

It is no surprise that Turkey-Textiles did little to clarify the issue. Because

there is no consensus as to what "substantially all the trade" requires,

interpretations vary from one country to another. Many agreements carve out

significant portions of sensitive sectors. For example, Australia has agreed to

limit the scope of services covered

i,n its FTA with Thailand, and New Zealand

has also agreed to largely exclude services from its Thai FTA.67 These types of

carve-outs are problematic because it will presumably be more difficult for

other

countries

going

forward

to

get

concessions

from

Thailand

on

liberalisation of services than it would have been in the absence of the New

Zealand and Australian FT As.68

3. WTO-plus provisions and non-trade objectives
Other agreements raise additional concerns by providing coverage on a WTO

plus basis, or by including what have been called "non-trade" objectives, such

as undertakings to protect labour rights and the environment. 69 An example of

the former is the Australia-United States FT A, which provides for intellectual

property

protections

far

above

what

the

WTO's

intellectual

property

agreement, TRIPS, requires. These provisions have significantly impacted

Australia's ability to provide affordable access to pharmaceuticals through its

Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme and have come under significant criticism.70

Similarly, the United States-Morocco FTA institutionalises the controversial
practice of "evergreening" whereby patents must be registered on existing

drugs if a "new use" for the drugs is identified. This practice allows patent
holders to obtiun additional patent protection above that required under the

66

WTO, Turkey - Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, ( 1999)
WT/DS34/ABIR, AB-1 999-5, para 48 (Report of the Appellate Body), [emphases in the
original].

67

These limitations can arise in the context of FfAs that are narrowly drawn but also ones that
are largely comprehensive. Even within a broad-ranging FfA a "positive listings" approach
may be adopted for certain sectors, whereby the only areas that are liberalised within the
sector are those that are specifically identified and scheduled.

68

It is of course also possible, as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official has suggested
to the author, that the United States may be able to push New Zealand's potential FrA
partners to agree to certain liberalising measures that New Zealand will then be able to insist
upon as well, in its own future negotiations.

69

Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future
of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium (2004) 23, available
online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005)..

70

B Lokuge, TA Faunce, and R Denniss, A Backdoor to Higher Medicine Prices? Intellectual
Property and the Australia-US Free Trade Agreement (2003); C Arup, "The United States
Australia Free Trade Agreement - the Intellectual Property Chapter" (2004) 15(4) Aus Intell
Prop J 205, 222-224.
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TRIPS Agreement. 7 1 Likewise, concerns have been raised about the increased
intellectual property protections provided in the United States-Chile and
United States-Singapore FTAs. 72
Criticisms have also been levelled at FTAs that contain undertakings
pertaining to

environmental and labour protections.

Examples

of such

agreements include the Ubited States' FTAs first with Mexico and Canada
(under NAFfA) and more recently with Jordan, Australia, Chile, and
Singapore.73 To the extent that FTAs are used to import into the free trade
realm requirements that increase rather than decrease trade barriers, such FTAs
are clearly undermining the multilateral process of attempting to liberalise
trade.74 The introduction of environmental and labour requirements that are
expensive to satisfy will have the additional undesirable effect of removing
some of the comparative advantage previously enjoyed by poorer countries.75
For now there is nothing to stop countries from entering into these types of
FTAs. FTAs are subject to examination and consensus-based assessment by
the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements ("CRTA"). The CRTA
has more of a political than a legal function, however. It does not exercise any
meaningful oversight over FTAs at present and as such has failed to curtail this
problem. To be sure, the opinions expressed at the CRTA reveal sharp
.,,

divisions between party countries to various FTAs and non-party countries
over the GATT consistency of the agreements: Those belonging to a particular
FTA assert that it is consistent with the GATT, while those outside it insist
otherwise; the resulting CRTA report thus ends up presenting the two opposing
arguments in most cases. But because the CRTA operates on a consensus
basis, FTAs can and do go into effect with the question of GATT consistency
unsettled.

I'

C. A Game Theory Explanation: FTAs as a New Prisoner 's Dilemma .
The FTA paradox is perhaps best explained as a form of prisoner' s dilemma.
The prisoner's dilemma illustrates a set of circumstances under which both
parties to a dilemma consistently choose one option, which results in a less
favourable outcome than had they both chosen the opposing option. The

71

A Cosbey, Sober Reflection: Considering the Rush to Regionalism (Trade Knowledge
Network paper, May 2005) 8, available online at <http://www.tradeknowledgenetwork.net>
(last accessed 15 November 2005).

72

See for example, Testimony of Gawain Kripke, Senior Policy Advisor, Oxfarn America,
(before the Subcommittee on Trade of the US House Committee on Ways and Means on. the
Implementation of US Bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Singapore and Chile, 10 June
2003), available online at <www.oxfamarnerica.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).

73

Testimony of Jagdish Bhagwati, (before Senate Finance Committee, The Jordan Free Trade
Agreement: The Wrong Template, 20 March 2001); Report by the Consultative Board to the
Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional
�hallenges in the New Millenium (2004), available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed
20 October 2005) (arguing that such provisions should not be included in FTAs). Others
object to the current provisions on the grounds that they do not go far enough: S M Cone ill,
"The Promotion of Free-Trade Areas Viewed in Terms of Most-Favored Nation Treatment
and 'Imperial Preference'" (2005) 26 Mich J Int'l L 563, 577.

74

See Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne 0 Krueger (eds), The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade

Agreements (1995) 14.
75

,,
,.

Ibid, 31.
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original example goes something like this: two prisoners who committed a

crime are confined separately and are unable to speak to one another. They

have promised each other in advance not to confess. The prisoners are each
told that if one confesses and the other does not, the confessor would be set

free, while the prisoner that remained silent would receive a jail sentence of
ten years. If both confess, each will serve two years in jail.

If neither confesses,

each will serve six months in jail. These parameters are set forth graphically

below.

Prisoner B Stays Silent
Prisoner B Betrays

Prisoner A Stays Silent
Both serve
A serves

6 months

10 years, B

goes free

Prisoner A Betrays

B serves

1 0 years; A

goes free

Both serve2 years

The Nash equilibrium -the choice that rational parties always arrive at -

for the prisoner's dilemma is for both prisoners to betray or defect rather than
to cooperate. Evaluating the options demonstrates why confessing is rational.

Prisoner A realises that if he stays quiet, there are two possible outcomes.

First, that prisoner B will stay quiet as well, resulting in a six-month jail

sentence for A. Alternatively, B will confess, in which case A will serve ten
years in jail. Prisoner A next determines the possible outcomes if he confesses.

If he confesses and B does not, A goes free. If B confesses as well, they will

both serve two years. Thus A sees the options as stay quiet (six months/ten

years) or confess (free/two years). We can see therefore why A chooses to

betray his co-conspirator and confess to the crime. Prisoner B goes through

exactly the same analysis and also confesses.

Although one can understand why both pris.oners defect, and can see that

this decision is rational, this is not the Pareto optimal outcome.76 The outcome

of both confessing is not optimal because the prisoners would each be better
off if they both cooperated and stayed silent.

In the trade context, this type of inefficient behaviour is not new. When left

to their own devices, many countries see the safest choice as maximising

exports while minimising imports. However, the more a country limits its

imports, the more it will encourage other countries to erect barriers to its

exports. Comparative advantage tells us though that the efficient outcome is

for all countries to decline to restrict imports. Thus a prisoner's dilemma

exists.77 Countries thus agreed to erect legal barriers - first through the GATT

and now through the WTO - against protectionism in order to achieve
economic benefits that would not have resulted based on the stand-alone

choices of individual countries. As such, the formation of the GATT, followed

by the WTO, can be seen as providing a solution to this particular prisoner's

dilemma.78 Even though countries generally believed that overall economic
76

A Pareto optimal or efficient outcome is one where the action taken has improved the
situation of at least one party without making the other worse off.

77

See for example, J Simser, "GATS and Financial Services: Redefining Borders" (1996)
3 Buffalo Uni J of Int'l L 33, 40-4 1 .

570

New Zealand Universities Law Review

Vol 21

welfare would be maximised through global trade liberalisation, there was an
incentive to agree to liberalise but then to cheat or defect.

An example of this was the abuse of GATT Article XIX, which provides an

"escape clause" allowing members to take emergency actions (on an MFN

basis) to protect their industries against import surges. Countries adopted

measures such as Voluntary Export Restraints ("VERs") and Orderly Market
Arrangements ("OMAs") under the rubric of Article XIX These measures,

while not specifically permitted under the escape clause, were not specifically

precluded. These "grey-area" measures consisted of countries either agreeing

"voluntarily" to limit exports in response to complaints about surges in imports

- VERs79 - or importing and exporting governments agreeing to limit the

quantity of a good that would be traded - OMAs.80 Such practices were
effectively reinstating quotas and other trade-distorting measures that had been

phased out and substituted with less trade-distorting tariffs through multiple

rounds of GATT negotiations. Thus, when left unchecked, countries -

particularly those with the most powerful economies - created an end-run

around some of the liberalisation requirements of the GATT. As a result of the

Uruguay Round negotiations, WTO members agreed to change this inefficient

dynamic - though many others remain to be addressed - and to forego the

right to negotiate VERs, OMAs, and the like.81 The WTO thus serves as an
institutional mechanism to get countries to agree to liberalisation and to

impose consequences in the event of cheating.

What we are seeing at present is that FTAs are presenting a new prisoner' s

dilemma. The choice to enter into bilateral Ff As can be seen a s a defection of

sorts- from the cooperative endeavour of the WTO. Everyone seems to agree

the best collective result is to negotiate the elimination of trade barriers

through the multilateral system. Yet under the current regime, countries see
that there are opportunities to obtain pockets of trade liberalisation through

FTAs, and also to have some ability to shield sensitive industries from quick

liberalisation. As a result, some countries perceive their individual interests

being maximised by going the bilateral route, if only other countries stick to
the multilateral path. Of course due to the shifts in comparative advantage, we

see .the "me too" effect taking place, and countries are not able to maintain the

comparative advantages obtained through FfAs for very long. As a result, we

increasingly see that countries are all falling into the bilateral/bilateral box,

even though they would benefit more if all countries instead took the

multilateral path.
78

D A Farber and R E Hudec, "Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A GATT's-Eye View of
the Dormant Commerce Clause" (1994) 47 Vanderbilt L Rev 140 1 , 1405. Farber and Hudec
argue that in the trade context, "an enforcement mechanism is required, not because it is in
the interest of each state to defect from the agreement - economists are pretty much united
in the view that it isn't - but because the mercantilist perspective that prevails in most
political debate makes it seem so". Ibid, 1405.

79

Of course, VERs were not truly voluntary and instead resulted from negotiations with the
importing country.

80

In essence OMAs were quite similar to VERs, but involved more explicit involvement of the
importing government.

81

See WTO Agreement on Safeguards (1994), Art l l: l(b) ( A WTO member "shall not seek,
take, or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or other
similar measures on the export or import side . . . ").
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Multilateral

Bilateral

Multilateral

Win some/win some

Bilateral

Win much/lose much

Lose much/win much

Country A

Country B

Win little/win little

However, as with the classic prisoner's dilemma, countries are not being

foolish or irrational. To the contrary, the rational decision in this situation is in

fact to. take a bilateral approach. But while this decision is rational, it is not

Pareto efficient.

As a result, we are now seeing the old inefficiencies played out anew.

Countries have replaced OMAs, VERs, and tariffs with FfAs that carve out or
build in lengthy phase-outs for their sensitive industries and otherwise

undermine the potential for reducing trade barriers on all goods and services

on an MFN basis.

IV. IS THERE A WAY 0UT OF THE PARADOX?
What is the key to escaping the FfA paradox? Can the prisoner' s dilemma be

resolved? Studies on the prisoner's dilemma have shown that "unless the

number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or
some other device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational,

self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group

interests."82 However, research suggests that in repeated iterations of the

dilemma, parties can learn to choose the most efficient outcome. When the

exercise is repeated in multiple rounds, parties experience the detrimental
effects of defecting and there is then an increase in cooperation. 83 Therefore,

the key to solving the prisoner's dilemma may be to implement a sanction of

some sort for entering into suboptimal FfAs. First, cheating - in this context

entering into problematic FfAs - must be punished. Second, countries must
recognise that there is in fact a credible threat that cheating will be punished.

Finally, the punishment or sanction must be big enough to wipe out any gains
from cheating.84

This all suggests the need for the WTO to impose conditions that will

change the incentive structure for countries, so that there is either a prohibition

on, or a clear disincentive from, entering into FfAs that are not true to the

purpose of Article XXIV. The WTO must remove the option - even if

countries still desire it - of going the bilateral route when it is at the expense
of the multilateral process. And to the extent countries disregard any new

regulations designed to prevent FfAs that greatly undermine the WTO system,

they will do so at the peril of having to defend their agreement before the

Dispute Settlement Body. If Article XXIV is clarified and strengthened,

presumably more cases would be brought challenging certain FfAs as being

GATT-inconsistent. All of these steps would have the effect of changing the

82

Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (197 1 ) 2.

83

See for example A 0 Sykes, " 'Mandatory' Retaliation for Breach of Trade Agreements:
Some Thoughts on the Strategic Design of Section 301" (1990) 8 Bost Int'l Law J 301, 308.

84

Ibid, 309-3 10.
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pay-off matrix featuring in the present prisoner' s dilemma. The key i s to

change the rules such that countries no longer perceive choosing FfAs over
the multilateral system as being in their best interest.

This isn't to say that the WTO membership should repeal Article XXIV, or

that FfAs should no longer be permitted. FfAs are clearly here to stay.

However, the WTO can and should change the way Ff As are reviewed, so that
the FfAs that are entered into are those that have the greatest potential for

spurring on the multilateral process, and not those that, by virtue of excluding
sensitive sectors or adding trade-dampening clauses, will hinder the process of
multilateral trade liberalisation.

The GATT examined FfAs and customs unions through what was called

the working party review system. Pursuant to Article XXIV:?, parties to an

FfA must provide to the contracting parties notification of the FfA as well as

a plan for making the necessary reductions in trade barriers.85 Notification

resulted in the creation of a working party which was tasked with examining

the agreement and reporting to the WTO General Council. 86 The Council
would

then

adopt the report

and

the contracting

parties

would

make

recommendations · thereon. 87 The working party review system was highly

ineffective from the beginning. The working party tasked with reviewing the

EEC was unable to reach agreement with the EEC countries regarding the
compatibility of the customs union with Article XXIV. 88 Due to this impasse

and the unwillingness of the GATT membership as a whole to derail the EEC,

no decision was ever formally reached with respect to the EEC' s adherence to
Article XXIV. 89

This

experience

laid

the

groundwork

for

continued

indecisiveness, with the result that of the eighty working parties that examined

FfAs for consistency with Article XXIV, only one agreement was ever found
to be in conformity,90 and no FfAs were ever found to be not in conformity.91

Thus the overwhelming majority of agreements came into effect without any

consensus as to their consistency with Article XXIV.

As a result of dissatisfaction with the ad hoc system, WTO members

agreed at the

1996 Singapore Ministerial Meeting to replace the working party

review system with the CRTA.92 The terms of reference for the CRTA

inc.luded examining new agreements, assessing systemic implications of FfAs,

and making recommendations to the General Council.93 Unfortunately, the
85

WTO, Regionalism and the World Trading System (1995) 9.
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The General Council is the governing body of the contracting parties (now WTO members).

87

WTO, Regionalism and the World Trading System (1 995) 10.

88

Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 902-903.

89

Ibid, 903.
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The only agreement ever to be found in conformity with Art XXIV is the customs union
between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. See James H Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements
in the GATTIWTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement (2002) 1 3 1 .
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Z Hafez, "Weak Discipline: GATT Article XXIV and the Emerging WTO Jurisprudence on
RTAs" (2003) 79 ND L Rev 879, 903.
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WTO, Decision of the General Council of6 February 1996 (WT/Ul27, Geneva, 7 February
1 996). James H Mathis, Regional Trade Agreements in the GATTIWTO: Article XXIV and the
Internal Trade Requirement (2002) 1 3 1 .
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Mathis, ibid.
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parties have still been unable to reach agreement as to the proper interpretation
of Article XXIV, and as such have been unable to reach consensus about a
single free trade agreement. The Slovakia-Czech Republic·agreement remains
the only customs union to have received an affirmative recommendation. 94 Not
even the Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement
("CER"), which is considered one of the "cleanest" FfAs in existence, has
received formal approval from the CRTA. 95 The CRTA is perpetually
hamstrung by its dependency on the consensus of the WTO membership.
Because over a hundred FfAs have come into effect even without working
party or CRTA approval, members have realised that the CRTA has no real
teeth. Were the CRTA to both have and exercise the power to prohibit FfAs
that were inconsistent with Article XXIV, we would see FfAs that more
closely complemented rather than clashed with the multilateral system. As
such, parties would either devote their efforts primarily to the WTO rounds, or
would be additionally chipping away at the remaining barriers through FfAs.
This would be a far more efficient result than what we see today.
In light of these considerations, what can and should individual countries
do to act in their best interests, yet avoid undermining the WTO? The ultimate
solution to the spaghetti bowl effect and these other inefficiencies would of
course be for all countries to reduce all tariffs to zero. 96 If and when this
occurs, FfAs will become largely redundant except for the value they provide
in increasing linkages in areas not covered by the WT0.97 Even a removal of
tariffs on manufactured goods would be beneficial, as it would remove the
current problem of inconsistent practices in determining rules of origin. 98
While WTO members are not likely to agree to remove all tariffs in the
near future, there are other measures that· can be taken now. First, members
should recognise that due to the "me too" effect, the comparative advantage
benefits

that

result

from

FfAs

may

be

short-lived.

Achieving

new

commitments through a multilateral round of WTO negotiations will result in
far more significant benefits than negotiating "catch up" FfAs. Second,
countries should be wary about agreeing to carve-outs of specific sectors,
WTO-plus-type protections, or lengthy phase outs for sensitive sectors. Each
of these types of provisions may serve as models for future Ff As, thus making
it all the more difficult to achieve across-the-board liberalisation through the
WTO. And third, WTO members should make it a priority to clarify the terms

94

Ibid.
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In the case of CER, European and American officials have reportedly told their Australian
counterparts that the FfA "sets too high a bar" and would raise scrutiny directed towards
other FfAs.
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The Consultative Board suggests that developed countries commit to reduce all tariffs to zero
by a certain date: Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai
Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New

Millenium (2004) 26, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005).
97

See generally, C Barfield et a!, "The Multilateral System and Free Trade Agreements: What's
the Strategy?" (2003) 37 Int'l L 805.
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J Crawford and R V Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements
(2005) 18, available online at <www.wto.org> (last accessed 20 October 2005). The need for
preferential rules of origin would disappear if there were no longer a tariff differential
depending on the country from which a product originated.
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of Article XXIV and strengthen the CRTA . The "substantially all" requirement
should be amended to make clear that FfAs must result in a very high level of
coverage both qualitatively and quantitatively, such that significant carve-outs
are no longer an option. 99 In addition, members could amend Article XXIV to
require that FfAs be made open to other countries that are willing to match the
terms

provided.

consistency

1 00

An

open

accession

rule

would

result in

increased

and would simplify expanding trade liberalisation achieved

through Ff As.

101

This openness would light a clear path from discrete bilateral

agreements to the more desirable lowering of barriers on a multilateral basis.
Finally, members could give the CRTA specific guidelines for determining
whether an Ff A satisfies the strengthened version of Article XXIV and a
mandate to reach a decision within a set time limit. If an FfA did not pass
muster, it would not be treated as a valid FfA for WTO purposes. The
consequence could be that, if the parties nonetheless proceeded with their
invalid Ff A, other countries could challenge the preferential market access
provided under the FTA as a violation of MFN. Whatever measures are taken,
countries should act sooner rather than later. There are already hundreds of
FTAs in effect, and more being negotiated all the time. The damage being
done to the multilateral system will only increase if steps are not taken to
reverse the current trend.
In sum, countries are flocking to suboptimal FTAs at the expense of the
multilateral system. This dynamic must change - and soon - as it is
undermining the ability and the will of WTO members to do the hard work
necessary to lower trade barriers on a multilateral basis.

99

One possibility among many would be to require coverage of at least ninety-five per cent of
items listed in the proposed FfA partners' tariff schedules and at least ninety-five per cent of
the value of the goods traded between the proposed partners.

100 The Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement recently negotiated among
New Zealand, Brunei, Chile, and Singapore - termed the P4 Agreement - has such an open
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Parties, by any APEC Economy or other State. The terms of such accession shall take into
account the circumstances of that APEC Economy or other State, in particular with respect to
timetables for liberalisation." Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, Art
20.6.1, available online at <Www.mfat.govt.nz> (last accessed 20 October 2005).
101 Agreements that are inherently exclusionary are more problematic because, as discussed
above, they are discriminatory and frequently are not trade enhancing.

